Seven myths about Kaliningrad by Pelczynska-Nalecz, Katarzyna & -
Seven myths about Kaliningrad
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Due to the integration to the European Union Poland and Lithuania
intend to introduce overall visa obligation for the Russian citizens.
Currently the Russians entering Poland may present at the border
a voucher, an invitation, or an AB stamp, which entitles them to busi-
ness travels. Lithuania maintains visa reliefs for the inhabitants of
Kaliningrad and the Russians travelling from and to the enclave. The
decisions encounter an opposition on the Russian side, which is of the
opinion that the activities will result in the isolation of the enclave. This
is why Moscow insists on the maintaining of a visa free movement
between the enclave and the rest of Russia. The recent statements made
by President Putin on the EUÐRussia summit meeting in Moscow (May
29) and the Council of Baltic Sea States summit meeting in Petersburg
(June 10-11) show a significant hardening of the Russian position on this
matter. President Putin has even made the whole of the Russian relations
with the European Union conditional on the resolving of the Kaliningrad
problem according to the plans of Moscow. During the last few weeks
not only the Russian politicians were making statements on the
Kaliningrad issue but also representatives of the Polish, Lithuanian and
Western authorities, as well as the EU officials. So far, the last ones have
definitely rejected the possibility of adopting any rules going beyond the
framework of the Schengen provisions towards Kaliningrad.
The debate that has sparked off around the issue of Kaliningrad is most-
ly based on a series of unfounded assumptions, which are commonly
regarded as obvious. Undoubtedly they make the rational resolving of
the enclave problem even more difficult. In this text the author has
attempted to identify and straighten out these ÒmythicalÓ elements of
the discussion, and next to set a possible course of further action.
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The most popular myths 
about transit to the enclave
Myth 1. The rejection of the Russian demands on visa-free transit to
Kaliningrad by the EU will significantly weaken the position of
President Putin in the country, it may also induce him to turn his back
on the pro-European course of the foreign policy.
It seems obvious that anti-Western rhetoric applied in the context of
visas is aimed at, among other things, the neutralisation of a negative
atmosphere in these circles of authorities and of the public opinion, who
assess the pro-Western policy of the Kremlin very negatively. The long-
term dependence of the RussianÐEU relations on the issue of transit to
Kaliningrad does not seem very probable, however. The deterioration of
the relationship with the EU would threaten vital political and econom-
ic interests of the Russian Federation (it may hinder trade, power engi-
neering cooperation and it may negatively affect the possible inflow of
the EU capital to Russia) and it would result in far greater losses than the
unsolved problem of transit to the Russian enclave.
The issue of transit to Kaliningrad does not seem to threaten the posi-
tion of Vladimir Putin in the country, either. Uncompromising declara-
tions concerning the enclave may pay off to the Kremlin, regardless of
the result of the visa dispute. The possible change of the EU position
would undoubtedly be a personal success of the President. But the lack
of change may also be played through to the benefit of Moscow because
it will allow Russia to put all the blame for the negative consequences of
visa introduction, or a bad situation in the enclave in general, on the
European Union. Such propaganda manoeuvres may be currently carried
out very effectively because all the Russia-wide TV channels are to
a greater or lesser extent controlled by the Kremlin.
It is worth adding that so far the majority of the Russian society has not
perceived the issue of Kaliningrad as a particularly important one. This
can be easily proved by the fact that in the opinion poll conducted on
June 13, (already after the EUÐMoscow summit meeting, during which
President Putin has presented a hard-line position on the passenger t r a n-
P O L I C Y B R I E F S
1 4
sit to and from the enclave) by the Fond Obshtchestvennogo Mneniya, on
the question about the most important problems of the contemporary
Russia no one indicated the problem of the Kaliningrad enclave.
Myth 2. The problem of transit to and from Kaliningrad is related to
the introduction of visas by Poland.
No transit route between Kaliningrad and other Russian regions is run-
ning through the Polish territory, although for the last decade such an
idea has come up a few times (the GoldapÐSuvalkiÐGrodno road). Due to
this fact the introduction of visas by Poland will not have a significant
influence on the quality of transit between the enclave and the rest of
Russia. However, the visa regime on the PolishÐKaliningrad border is
significant from the point of view of the PolishÐKaliningrad cross-border
relations. The majority of crossings on this border is related to illicit
shuttle trade. The introduction of visas will limit these dealings, which
in the short-term perspective will undoubtedly have adverse conse-
quences for the local community (on both sides of the border). However,
from the point of view of long term national objectives such limitation
seems indispensable.
Land transit between the Kaliningrad oblast and the rest of Russia takes
place first of all through Lithuania and Belarus by railway (the
MoscowÐKaliningrad connection) and by road transport, mainly via the
routes of KibartaiÐVilniusÐMedininkai (260 km); and KibartaiÐDru s ke n i k i Ð
ÐRaigardas (130 km).
Land transit is also possible through the territory of Lithuania and
Latvia; by car (such option is favourable if travellers are coming from or
to the north-European regions of the Russian Federation), or by railway
(the KaliningradÐPetersburg connection). Taking into account the possi-
ble travelling routes the visa regulations introduced by Lithuania and
the regulations applicable in Latvia will be significant for the issue of
transit to the enclave.
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Myth 3. The introduction of visas is equivalent to the eliminating 
of visa free drive or ride on the KaliningradÐRussia route.
The Kaliningrad oblast is not isolated and it will not be isolated from
Russia after the EU enlargement because it has a direct connection by
sea to the rest of the country. You can also travel from the oblast to
Moscow by plane. It is true that the passenger sea transport is practi-
cally non-existent and the air transport is poorly developed indeed, but
this is due to the insufficient interest of Moscow in the development of
these connections and also to the lack of funds to start a ferry crossing
and to subsidise the only air carrier in the enclave, ÒKaliningrad-AviaÓ
which is suffering from a crisis.
Myth 4. The introduction of visas will only make it more difficult for
the Russians to cross the Kaliningrad border.
The abolition of visa reliefs by Lithuania and Poland will undoubtedly
result in particular difficulties for the Russians leaving and entering the
enclave. These difficulties will be related to the necessity to perform for-
malities in order to obtain a visa. Apart from adverse effects the tight-
ening of the visa regime will have positive results for a significant num-
ber of travellers. First of all the visas will eliminate a considerable num-
ber of shuttle-traders blocking the border crossing points with a few
kilometres long waiting lines (this is relevant mainly for the Police bor-
der). Consequently, the clearance time will be shortened (presently it
takes several hours for people travelling in passenger cars and a dozen
or so up to a few dozen hours for the TIR drivers.
Undoubtedly the improvement of border crossing conditions will also
considerably bring down cross border fraud as there will be no need to
bribe the militia officials or border guards (for example in order to speed
up the clearance procedure). Presently such practices prevail on the bor-
der crossing points to the enclave.
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Myth 5. The isolation of the oblast is mainly the result of decisions
taken by the European Union. 
The authorities of the Russian Federation have a huge influence on the
opportunities of establishing a relationship between the inhabitants of
the oblast and the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries. The Ru s s i a n
side dictates the costs and the waiting time for issuing passports to the
inhabitants of the enclave (only one fourth of the oblast inhabitants are
holders of such a document). Moscow decides also on the extending of air
and sea connections between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. The
Russian authorities are also responsible for the possible subsidies to
plane and ferry tickets if they proved too expensive for the inhabitants of
the enclave. But first of all it is the Russian authorities who decide about
the possibilities of access of foreign citizens to the enclave. The degree of
isolation of the region is shaped not only by trip opportunities of its
inhabitants but by the openness for the citizens of foreign countries,
including the neighbouring countries. However, even now the process of
obtaining a Russian visa is long and costly. The Russian consul is obliged
to send each visa application to the Ministry of Fo reign Affairs headquar-
ters for approval and the cost of a visa varies from a few dozens to a h u n-
d red and a few dozen dollars. The number of staff employed in the
Russian consulates in Poland and Lithuania raises some doubts about the
possibilities of providing a quick service to a higher number of appli-
cants. So it is quite probable that once Russia introduces the visa obliga-
tion, passenger traffic to the enclave will decline to the minimum.
Myth 6. The possible solutions to the issue of transit boil down to the
following alternative: to introduce the visa obligation, or not. The
Schengen acquis leaves little room for manoeuvre in looking for
a mutually beneficial solution.
There is a number of solutions the application of which would consider-
ably facilitate the transit, and which would not need to go beyond the
Schengen framework. First of all it is possible to facilitate the procedure
of visa issuance. For example the requirement of presenting enough
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financial means for survival in the Schengen countries may be trans-
ferred to the persons inviting the visa applicants, and the amount itself
may be lowered. The visa fee may also be subject to negotiations.
Declarations of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the candidate coun-
tries show that the visa fees may be fixed even at the level of a few dol-
lars for a single crossing visa and a dozen or so dollars for a multiple-
entry visa. But the most important instrument in the minimising of neg-
ative consequences of visa introduction by the EU will be the efficiency
of the consular infrastructure, the Schengen Information System, and
the border crossing points. The application of various technology solu-
tions (for example magnetic readers), the increase in the number of con-
sular counters etc. may also play an important role.
Myth 7. The introduction of visas by Poland and Lithuania will be
equivalent to the entering of these countries into the Schengen zone.
The introduction of the Schengen acquis as an element of the acquis com-
munautaire is obligatory for the candidate countries and it must be com-
pleted even before the commencing of the process of ratifying the acces-
sion agreements by the EU countries (so in practice at least a year before
the scheduled enlargement). This does not mean, however, that Poland
or Lithuania are automatically admitted to the Schengen zone Ð this
decision lies with the countries already belonging to the zone, and it is
taken on the basis of the assessment of the state of preparation of
a given candidate to the fulfilment of various requirements. Such proce-
dures may take up even a few years. Until then the new Member States
will issue national visas valid only on their territory. The Executive
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement does not provide in
details for the rules of their issuance (including fees), or their validity
periods.
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Re c o m m e n d a t i o n s
The identification and the placing in the real context of the most impor-
tant ÒmythsÓ appearing in the debate on the transit to Kaliningrad
allows to formulate a series of suggestions about the possible directions
of the Polish and the EU policy on Kaliningrad.
1. It is particularly significant not to be guided by fears for the stability
of the pro-Western course of Russia and the domestic position of
Vladimir Putin in the debate with Moscow. It does not seem that the
non-fulfilment of the demands put forward by Russia would lead to
a slump in the social support to the Russian president, or to a long-
standing deterioration in the RussiaÐEU relationship.
2. At the same time we have to be aware of the fact that for both the EU
and for Russia the discussion about transit to Kaliningrad has a much
wider significance than the bare issue of solving the problem of cross-
ings between the enclave and the remaining Russian regions. In other
words the game for Kaliningrad is a game in which there is much more
at stake than just the oblast isolation. This is first of all a discussion
about the position of the Russian Federation in Europe Ð its ability to
work out a special, preferential (compared to the positions of other EU
neighbours) position in the relationship with the EU. There is a prevail-
ing conviction in Russia that, just as it has been with NATO, Moscow
may set special preferential treatment rules in its cooperation with
Brussels. That is why the way of resolving the problem of transit
between the Russian Federation and Kaliningrad may become a prece-
dent which will determine the direction in the development of the long
term MoscowÐBrussels relationship.
3. In the debate relating to the issue of Kaliningrad isolation it is worth
drawing a dividing line between two problems: the problem of the tran-
sit between the enclave and the remaining regions of Russia, and the
problem of visa regime for the persons leaving the enclave. In the first
case undoubtedly some special solutions are necessary (within the
Schengen acquis), in the second case there are no circumstances calling
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for any particular facilitation. Consequently, the discussion about non-
transit related visa regulations should not focus in any special way on
the enclave.
4. The debate on the transit between Kaliningrad and other Russian
regions should be brought down first of all to such solutions related to
this issue which are adopted in Lithuania and possibly in the two
remaining Baltic States Ð this is where the transit route runs to and from
Russia. It does not seem justified, however, to include Poland in this
debate, because there is no transit route running here. The transition
solutions adopted by Poland should be discussed only in the general con-
text of the visa regime for the Russians.
5. The issue of particular importance is the abandoning of the discussion
on visa or visa-free nature of the transit. It seems already settled that all
solutions related to the problem must not go beyond the Schengen rules.
In this situation it is worth focusing on different possibilities acceptable
form the point of view of the EU provisions (visa fees, issuance proce-
dures, EU consular infrastructure in the enclave etc.).
6. It is also worth remembering that the degree of oblast isolation does
not depend only on the visa regulations introduced by the EU. There is
a series of areas, not related directly to visas, where much could be done
in order to facilitate the contact between the enclave and the rest of the
country. This is first of all about developing sea and air connections. It
should be highlighted that changes in these areas depend mainly on
Russia, the EU may, however, offer its help (for example loans, invest-
ment in airline and port infrastructure).
7. The discussions on transit should also be linked to the negotiations
about the openness of the oblast for foreigners. The arrivals of Poles,
Lithuanians, and also other persons from abroad to the oblast are an
important factor preventing the isolation of the enclave.
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